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The "meeting competition" proviso in Section 2(b) of the
Robinson-Patman Act' is undoubtedly one of the most significant
defenses available to a seller? From the outset of their mutual dealing
with the section 2(b) language, the Commission and the courts have
differed over the interpretation and scope of the defense. Several
recent decisions have exemplified this conflict, and presage skirmishes
to come. This comment attempts to fix the present location of the
battle lines and to indicate the most defensible positions.
The first clash between the courts and the Commission over the
interpretation of section 2(b), Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,' would
have been the last had the Commission's view, virtually writing the
defense out of the statute, prevailed. The respondent refiner was
ordered by the Commission to cease selling gasoline to some four large
"jobbers" in Detroit, at one and one half cents per gallon below the
prevailing price to retail stations; since the jobbers, while whole-
saling, sold largely at retail, the FTC found that the price differential
resulted in an injury to competition. Respondent's offer of evidence
that its lower price was made to meet the equally low price of com-
petitors, in order to retain the particular jobber customers, was re-
jected. The Commission contended that the defense was not available
where it had found an injury to competition or, alternatively, that
the availability of the defense depended on the extent of the injury
to competition resulting from meeting other sellers' prices. The
Supreme Court rejected the Commission's view and held that, if sup-
ported by the facts, section 2 (b) constituted an absolute defense to
a charge of price discrimination.'
* A.B. 1947, Tufts; LL.B. 1949, Harvard; Partner in the firm of Nutter, McClennen
& Fish, Boston.
1
 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958), amending 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
Upon proof being made, at any hearing . that there has been discrimination
in price .. • the burden of rebutting the prima-fade case thus made by show-
ing justification shall be upon the person charged .... Provided, however, that
nothing [herein contained) shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-fade
case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services
or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services of facilities furnished by a
competitor.
2 Barton, Defenses in Price Discrimination Cases, 17 A.B.A. Anti -Trust Section 389
(1960).
3 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 340 U.S. 231
(1950).
4 340 U.S. 231, 251 (1950). The opinion emphasizes that the Commission's construe-
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While the basic availability of the defense to a seller was thus
upheld, the Commission's acceptance of this result was reluctant, as
subsequent decisions showed.5
In Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC,' a proceeding under
section 2(d) of the act, 7 respondent was charged with making pay-
ments to customers for merchandising services rendered by the latter,
on a basis not proportionately available to all customers. The section
2(b) defense was tendered, but was rejected by the Commission on
the reasoning that the language of the proviso (". . . or the furnishing
of services . . .") limited the defense to situations where the seller
furnishes the services in kind.' The Court of Appeals reversed, ob-
serving that there was no reason in the purposes of the act or in logic
to create any distinction, insofar as the availability of the defense is
concerned, between a section 2(d) and a section 2(e) case. In both
situations, the economic effects are the same: the seller makes avail-
able to its customer merchandising assistance (either in kind or by
payments in lieu thereof). There is no reason to attribute to Congress
any intent to create such a distinction and, therefore, "furnishing"
as used in section 2(b) necessarily must be construed' to embrace
both arrangements.°
Lion not only received no support from the language of the act but was opposed to a
widespread understanding and assumption as to the availability of the defense, in the
circumstances of the case, by the courts and by the Commission itself. Id. at 243-47.
5
 Thus, in the same proceeding, on remand, the respondent's undisputed evidence
of a meeting of competitive offers by major and independent refiners to the four jobbers
in question was held by the Commission not to make out the § 2(b) defense because
the reductions were made pursuant to a "pricing system", FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945), rather than on an individual basis. On appeal the Commission
was reversed, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 396 (1957) (5-4 decision).
6
 No. 6966, Trade Reg. Rep. (1960 FTC Ord.) If 29,195, rev'd, — F.2d — (D.C. Cir.
1961), Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 FTC Cas.) II 70,157. In a subsequent similar case, Shul-
ton, Inc., No. 7321, Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 FTC Ord.) § 15,323, Commissioners Elman
and Kern dissented. Cf. Delmar Construction Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
— F. Supp. — (D. Fla. 1961), Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 FTC Cas.) § 69,947, which reaches
the same result as the circuit court in Exquisite Form Brassiere Inc., supra.
7 Supra note 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13(d):
[III shall be unlawful ... to pay . . . to . . . a customer ... as compensa-
tion . . . for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer
in connection with the .. , sale of any products . . . manufactured ... by such
person ... unless such payment . . . is available on proportionately equal terms
to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products . . .
6 That is, to a § 2(a) case:
It shall be unlawful . . . to discriminate . . . by contracting to furnish or fur-
nishing . . . any services or facilities . . not accorded to all purchasers on
proportionately equal terms.
Supra note 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13(3).
9 The Supreme Court has observed that "precision of expression is not an outstand-
ing characteristic of the Act." Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953).
10 The construction advanced by the Commission in the particular case was again
at variance with its views elsewhere expressed. In the FTC Guides for Advertising Al-
lowances and Other Merchandising Payments, the Commission recognized that for pur-
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In Sun Oil v. FTC" a common sense interpretation, consistent
with the objectives of the section 2 (b) proviso, was again substituted
by the Court of Appeals for a Commission construction having little
to recommend it but a barren textual support."
When gasoline "price wars", which periodically break out on the
retail level in various regions, are in progress, a gasoline distributor,
in order to enable its retail outlets in the area of the price reductions
to meet the prevailing prices and survive, is eventually required to
lower its prices to such retailers. In order not to encourage the spread
and duration of such episodes (an objective shared by the majority,
at least, of its retailers 73 ), as well as to minimize their cost, the dis-
tributor endeavors to confine its price assistance to its retailers most
directly and immediately encountering the lower prices. The differ-
entials thus set up among its various retail outlets have resulted in
actions against the distributor by the Commission, and by the retailers
continuing to pay the higher prices." Prior to the instant case, the
meeting competition defense had been rejected' 5 on the reasoning
that section 2 (b) only applied where a competitive price offer to the
respondent's customer was being met, and that competitive distrib-
utors' prices to their retailers were not offers to the respondent's
retailers.
In Sun Oil the usual situation was presented," the section 2 (b)
defense rejected, and a cease and desist order issued against the re-
spondent by the Commission. The Court of Appeals set aside the
order, holding that the section 2(b) defense was established!' Char-
poses of compliance with §§ 2(d) and (e) services could be substituted for payments,
and vice versa. It is difficult to see why a similar substitution could not be read into
§ 2(b), when there is no discernible difference in the administration of the act.
11
 55 F.T.C. 955 (1959), rev'd, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Or. 1961), Trade Reg. Rep.
(1961 FTC Cas.) f 70,083.
12 Supra note 9.
15
 See Sen. Rep. No. 2810, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-27 (1956).
14
 The Texas Company, No. 6898, Trade Reg. Rep. (1959 FTC Ord.) 11 26,754;
Enterprise Industries v. The Texas Co., 136 F. Stipp. 421 (D. Conn. 1955), rev'd, 240
F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
15
 See cases supra note 14; in Enterprise Industries, the only decision on the point
was by the District Court; on appeal the question was not raised by reason of the
Circuit Court's decision for the defendant on the issue of proof of damages.
18 294 F.2d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 1961). Only one of the respondent's retailers was
involved and the price reductions granted, in response to price cutting by a retailer of
unbranded gasoline located across the street, came too late to save the particular cus-
tomer, who subsequently went out of business.
17 The decision also rejected other contentions of the Commission, viz., that the
defense was barred by (1) an alleged agreement by the retailer to pass the requested
reductions on to its customers, argued as constituting illegal price fixing, id. at 482 ; and
(2) the respondent's action in cutting its dealer tank wagon price to within one cent
of the unbranded price, in the face of testimony that a premium of two cents is nor-
mally obtained by a trademarked gasoline, on the theory that this constituted not
"meeting" but the "beating", of a competitive price, id. at 483.
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acterizing the Commission's position as "doctrinaire" and "barren
logic"," the court reasoned that the respondent's "customer", in all
substance, is the ultimate consumer, and that the competitor's lower
price is, in effect, being offered to that consumer-customer, and being
met by the respondent through the lowered prices to its respective
retail outlets. The court pointed out that the Commission's construc-
tion worked against the purposes of the act by increasing the diffi-
culties of small retail outlets, and by encouraging the refiners to
integrate vertically."
The result reached by the court is sound; the secondary line
injury (i.e., among retail customers of the respondent-refiners), if
any, resulting from countenancing differential prices in these circum-
stances, is far less than the injury to the respondent's customers in the
price war areas, if the distributor is not allowed to lower its prices in
this selective fashion. 2°
A final instance of Commission interpretation of section 2 (b),
which may be noted, is its contention that the defense is limited to
"defensive" rather than "aggressive" price cutting, i.e., to "retaining
an old", rather than "getting a new", customer. In Sunshine Biscuits'
the respondent's subsidiary sold potato chips in the Cleveland area in
a market which the Commission found was marked by extremely
sharp competition and by the offering of discounts of five percent
and two percent "to certain favored purchasers". The respondent,
in order not to lose customers, offered like discounts not only to its
existing customers but also to its competitor's customers "and thus
was able to obtain new customers". 22
 The Commission held that sec-
tion 2 (b) was not available to respondent, as to the price cuts to the
new customers, regardless of the degree of competition in the market,
because section 2(b) was limited "to those situations in which the
seller is acting in self-defense".23
 The authorities relied on by the
18
 Id. at 473, 479. The court also noted, as was true of the cases discussed above,
that the Commission, in other contexts, had expressed a contrary view of the availability
of the II 2(b) defense on the facts of the case. 294 F.2d 465, 481 (1961), and see note
42 infra.
19
 Id. at 479, 481. The Commission will apparently refuse to follow the Sun Oil
rationale; cf. American Oil Co., No. 8183, Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 FTC Ord.) V 15,582.
But cf. Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 429 (1961).
20 The availability of	 2(b) as an absolute defense to the discrimination charge
in this situation probably depends upon the distributor's exercise of a good faith business
judgment in the selection of its customers to whom the price cuts, for the purpose of
meeting competitive prices, are granted; however, if the distributor's decision appeared
to be a reasonable one, the court should not substitute its judgment for the defendant's,
even though it might differ therewith. See Orbo Theatre v. Loew's, Inc., 156 F. Supp.
770, 778, aff'd per curiam, 261 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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Commission for this construction were the first Standard Oil case"
and an earlier Commission decision. 25
The Supreme Court cannot fairly be read as addressing itself
to the issue in Sunshine, as distinct from merely describing the appli-
cation of section 2(b) to the facts of the case then before it." By
contrast, a considered statement of the Court, in the second Standard
Oil case,27 is explicable only on the view that offensive price cutting
(on the facts of that case, at least) is lawful. 28
The question of precedents aside, the Commission's interpretation
disregards economic realities and, as a consequence, would prove un-
workable over a range of cases. Thus, as the dissent pointed out, the
"new" v. "old" and "retain" v. "gain" distinctions break down in a
repeat sale market. Where a large buyer purchased from a competitor
last month, from the defendant currently, and will be solicited by both
next month, which party can properly invoke section 2(b) as con-
strued by the Commission?
Again, the Commission's interpretation runs contrary to the
spirit and purpose of section 2(b), which, as the Supreme Court
suggested in the first Standard Oil case," was to reconcile the Rob-
inson-Patman Act with the other anti-trust laws by making an ac-
commodation for price competition. Limiting the availability of the
proviso to the preservation of existing customers 8° contemplates a
static situation which is the antithesis of true price competition.
24 340 U.S. 231 (1950).
For example ... the seller may well find it essential, as a matter of business sur-
vival, to meet that price rather than to lose the customer. . . . There is, on
the other hand, plain language . . . which permits a seller, through § 2(6), to
retain a customer by realistically meeting in good faith the price offered to that
customer . . .
Id. at 249-50.
25 Standard Motor Products, 54 F.T.C. 814 (1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.
1959). In this case the statements of both Commission and the Second Circuit regarding
§ 2(b) being confined to defensive price cutting were offhand, and apparently based
solely on the Standard Oil dictum. The case involved a flagrantly improper arrangement
whereby groups of buyers pooled their purchases and received rebates based on the
aggregate of the purchases.
28
 See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 184 (1955).
27
 FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1957).
28
 Thus, in 355 U.S. 396, 399-400, n.4 (1957), the Court stated: "There is no show-
ing or serious contention by the Commission that the offers of Standard's competitors
were unlawful." Inasmuch as the competitors' offers were used offensively (to entice
Standard's customers), their lawfulness must have derived from § 2(b), in the circum-
stances of a market traditionally characterized by discounts of one and a half to two
cents per gallon to desirable large-volume (euphemistically termed) "jobbers", since the
facts shown in the several opinions belie the availability of the cost justification or func-
tional discount defenses. See Standard Oil Company v. FTC, 233 F.2d 649, 654-55 (7th
Cir. 1956).
20 Standard Oil Company v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242, 248 (1950).
30 Presumably a defendant is not even free to meet prices in order to obtain a
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Although the Commission's restriction on the scope of the meeting
competition defense in Sunshine was somewhat more warranted by
the problems of administration of the act than was true in the other
cases discussed above," its construction is not, on balance, desirable."
In its natural concern to prevent the section 2(b) defense from be-
coming an open door to wide-spread price differentials, whereby one
seller justifies his price reductions by his competitor's prices and
vice versa, the Commission might better focus on whether a respond-
ent's price cutting (meeting) is in response to "individual competi-
tive situations".
It seems a reasonable conclusion, from the language and history
of section 2(b), that it applies only to meeting price cuts on a cus-
tomer-by-customer basis." On this view, certain earlier cases, which
have been described as denying the defense because the price met was
"unlawful",34
 can be analyzed as cases where the respondent's attempt
to justify a systematic granting of off-list prices fell outside the ra-
tionale of section 2 (b)." Thus, FTC v. A. E. Staley" or FTC v.
Standard Motor Products," where all prices sought to be justified
replacement for customers lost to undercutting competitors. Similarly, the Commission's
interpretation may well favor the established concern against the small newcomer,
placing the former's customers off-limits.
31
 Discounts of 2-5% might well, on the basis of Commission precedents, create the
likelihood of secondary line (among competing customers) and, possibly, primary line
(among competing sellers) injury. But see Note, Competitive Injury under the Robin-
son-Patman Act, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1597, 1610 (1961) (Market inertia may insulate
against the competitive effects of price differentials).
32
 Nor does the dissenting opinion offer much aid to the Commission: after vigor-
ously pointing out the difficulties inherent in the majority holding, the dissent suggests
only that the case should be remanded to determine whether the competitive prices were
"discriminatory" within the act, supra note 21. Since any differential price is a dis-
criminatory price, Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, 363 U.S. 536 (1959), this does not reach the
question of when a § 2(b) defense to such discrimination can be allowed.
33 FTC v. Standard Off Co., 355 U.S. at 401 (1957); FTC v. National Lead
Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1956) ; Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. at 244 (1950);
FTC v. A, E. Staley Mfg, Co., 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945).
:13 FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. at 430 (1956) ; FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
U.S. 683, 724 -25 (1948) ; FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 753 (1945) ; FTC
v. Standard Motor Products Co., 265 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1959); Standard Oil Co. v.
Brown, 238 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1956) ; cf. Report of the Attorney General's Committee,
supra note 26, at 181-82.
36 To urge, as the Commission would, that these cases, supra note 34, deny the
right to meet an "unlawful" price is unsatisfactory; an unlawful pirating price is the
very price which, so long as it is an individual competitive situation, a seller ought to be
free to meet promptly. Moreover, one avoids a logical dilemma otherwise presented by
the Sunshine rule (when coupled with the doctrine that an unlawful price cannot be
met): if Sunshine can properly meet a competitor's price to Sunshine's customer, but
cannot offer the same price to the competitor's customer, then the competitor's price to
Sunshine's customer must, on the same reasoning, be unlawful, with the result that
either offensive price cutting is lawful or unlawful prices can be made.
36 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
37 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959).
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were offered pursuant to an established list or "system", are clearly
outside the defense; equally clearly the defense is available where, as
in the Standard Oil cases, only some four of 350 odd accounts are in-
volved.
The interesting case would be the not uncommon, highly com-
petitive market situation between these two extremes, where less
than all, but more than a handful, of customers are traditionally ex-
tended discounts." While much would depend on the facts as to
price structure and the dissemination of competitive offers," it is
submitted that a defense of meeting competition (whether customers
are gained or merely retained) could be established in such a case,
notwithstanding that the instances of price-cutting were numerous."
If it be objected that this approach would perpetuate the widespread
price differentials in such a market, one answer is that such a result
has been recognized as being acceptable by Congress and the Supreme
Court in creating and giving scope to the section 2(b) defense, in or-
der to insure the leaven of price competition in the Robinson-Patman
loaf. Moreover, the government is free, if anti-competitive effects
should develop in such a market, either to move against the sellers
(under Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act) or against the larger,
favored buyers under Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act.'
From this survey of section 2(b) decisions, it is apparent that
the Commission's approach to the proviso has been characterized by
an overriding desire to limit the scope of the defense, to the point
where its constructions of section 2(b) have warranted rejection by
the courts.' To the latter, therefore, has fallen (in this area) the
"task" of rationalizing the Robinson-Patman Act with the other anti-
trust laws to the end of a common and harmonious body of law."
38
 E.g., the market situations apparently existing in: Sunshine Biscuits, supra note
21; Central Ice Cream Co. v. Goldenrod Ice Cream Co., 184 F. Supp. 312, 315 (N.D.
III, 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 265, 266 (7th Cir. 1961).
so And assuming always that the respondent seller has knowledge of facts justifying
a bona fide belief in the existence of competitive offers to his customers (actual or pros-
pective). Cf. Staley case, supra note 33, at 759-60.
40
 See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396, 403, n.8 (1957):
This is not a situation involving only one or two competitive raids, however;
continuation of reductions once granted is warranted by § 2(b) when competi-
tor's reduced price offers occur again and again in a cutthroat market.
Cf. Report of the Attorney General's Committee, supra note 26, at 182.
4t In the market conditions assumed, such buyers would normally have the required
knowledge that the seller's prices were not justified, Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346
U.S. 61, 80-81 (1953), so as to expose them to prosecution under § 2(f).
42 Undoubtedly the Commission's view of its role as prosecutor under the Robin-
son-Patman Act has contributed heavily to this situation. Another factor may well be
that the Commission has been assigned those statutes which tend to a pre-occupation
with injury to "competitors" rather than to "competition". Report of the Attorney
General's Committee, supra note 26, at 164-65.
43 Frankfurter, j., dissenting in FTC v. Motion Pictures Advertising Co., 344 U.S.
392, 406 (1952).
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Affording a reasonable scope to the section 2(b) defense will
contribute significantly to reconciling the differing price-market sys-
tems favored by the Sherman Act on one hand and by Robinson-Pat-
man on the other.
44 The Commission itself, speaking with reference to other antitrust laws, has
espoused the values of active bargaining for price cuts. Union Carbide, No. 6826, Trade
Reg. Rep. (1961 FTC Ord.) If 15,503 (Clayton Act § 7) ; Snap-on-Tools, No. 7116, Trade
Reg. Rep. (1961 FTC Ord.) § 15,546 (§ 5 FTC Act).
208
